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Adoption of Kelsey S.: When Does An
Unwed Father Know Best?
In America, more than four million children are born each
year.1 The number of those children born to unwed mother's has
rapidly increased over the last few decades, with out-of-wedlock
births rising from 10.7 percent in 1970 to 25.7 percent in 1986.2
While the stigma associated with being a single mother has
lessened in modern times,3 many children born out of wedlock will
be given up for adoption before their first birthday.4
The sobering reality of the above statistics is that the nature and
scope of an unwed father's rights are of tremendous practical
significance.5 An unwed father6 has traditionally had virtually no
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1991 62 (1 11th
ed. 1991). In 1989, there were 4,021,000 live births in the United States. Id.
2. Id. at 67. In 1950, four percent of all births were to unmarried women. Daniel C. Zinman,
Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father's Right To Raise His Infant Surrendered For Adoption,
60 FORDHAM L. REv. 971, 973 n.18 (1992) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus 66 (1985))
(discussing the effect of awarding adoptive parents custody of an infant placed for adoption pending
a lawsuit).
3. 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, §
21.1, at 568 (2d ed. 1987).
4. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsUS, supra note 1, at 376. In 1986, the most recent year for
which statistics are available, there were 104,088 adoptions in the United States. Id. In 1986,24,589
children adopted by unrelated persons were less than one year old with most children who are
adopted by non-relatives being born out-of-wedlock. NATIONAL CoMmrrE FOR ADOPTION,
ADOPTION FACTBOOK: UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATION AND RESoURcES 60 (1989)
(discussing the likelihood that a child placed for unrelated adoption will be an infant); CLARK, supra
note 3, at 574. Approximately half of these adoptions are normally by stepparents. Id. at 567. In
1986, some 52,157 adoptions were by unrelated persons. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note
1, at 376.
5. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 830 n.6, 823 P.2d 1216, 1223 n.6, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
615, 622 n.6 (1992).
6. This Note will use interchangeably the terms "unwed father," "biological father," "natural
father," and "putative father." See BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the term
"putative father" as an alleged or reputed father of a child born out of wedlock).
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say in whether his child would be placed for adoption.7 The
decision to place the child for adoption has rested entirely in the
hands of the mother In fact, until twenty-one years ago, unwed
fathers were given no federal constitutional equal protection or due
process rights in the adoption process.'
The move toward recognizing an unwed father's rights began
with Stanley v. Illinois," where the United States Supreme Court
held that an unwed father who had lived with and raised his
children could not have his children taken by the State upon the
death of the children's mother.11  The father's federal
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process would be
violated if he was not afforded an opportunity to prove his fitness
to have custody of the children." Since that landmark case, the
United States Supreme Court has extended the rights of unwed
fathers to include situations where an out-of-wedlock child is
offered for adoption.'3 So long as the unwed father has
established a relationship with his child, his federal constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection permit him to maintain
7. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 668 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (describing the
United States Supreme Court's decision as one which embarked on an innovative concept of the
natural law for unwed fathers); Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The
Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TuL. L. REv. 585, 595 (1991) (discussing the traditional
position of unwed fathers in the court and that position's relationship in the expanding recognition
of the constitutional rights of such fathers).
8. CLARK, supra note 3, § 21.2, at 572-73.
9. Id.; see Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (holding that under the Due Process Clause of the Federal
Constitution an unwed father was entitled to a hearing as to his fitness as a parent before his children
could be taken away from him); see infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text (discussing Stanley in
greater detail).
10. 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
11. Id. at 658.
12. Id.; see infra notes 41, 63, 67 (discussing equal protection and due process with regard
to unwed fathers).
13. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 267 (recognizing that an unwed father who
grasps his opportunity to develop a relationship with his child is protected by the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388
(1979) (holding that when an unwed father has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child,
any distinction by the State between unwed mothers and unwed fathers must serve an important
governmental interest); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,256 (1978) (affirming that the relationship
between parent and child is protected under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Federal Constitution); see infra notes 50-121 and accompanying text (discussing the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Lehr, Caban, and Quilloin).
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a relationship with his child.14 If such a relationship is established,
the father is also given a say in any decision to place his child for
adoption."5
Therefore, the putative father who has established a relationship
with his child born out-of-wedlock has found federal constitutional
protection for that relationship. 6 Under California law, such a
father is known as a "presumed father.""7 Unresolved by the
United States Supreme Court, however, is the situation where the
unwed mother has unilaterally prevented the putative father from
having any contact with his child." Such action effectively blocks
the father from participating in an adoption decision. 9 The recent
California Supreme Court case of Kelsey S., however, addressed
this question.2"
In Kelsey S., the supreme court held that California Civil Code
section 7004(a) and the related statutory scheme violated federal
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process for
14. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (recognizing that an unwed father who grasps his opportunity to
develop a relationship with his child is protected by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the United States Constitution); see infra notes 41, 63, 67 (discussing equal protection and due
process challenges to statutes denying unwed fathers the right to maintain a relationship with their
children).
15. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (holding that the State need not listen to the father's opinion
of what would be best for the child if there is no relationship between father and child).
16. Id.
17. California Civil Code section 7004(a) establishes that a man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child if he has married the mother or if he has received the child into his home and openly
held out the child as his natural child. CAI- CiV. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1992). Effective January
1, 1994, the statute will appear at California Family Code section 7611. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch.
162, sec. 10, at 549 (West). Under California Civil Code section 7004(b), the presumption created
by the statute is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence, except as provided in section 621 of
the Evidence Code. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 7004 (West Supp. 1992). California Evidence Code section
621 establishes that when a wife is cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, the
child is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp.
1992). Effective January 1, 1994, section 621 will appear at California Family Code section 7500.
1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 546 (West).
18. See Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816,830, 823 P.2d 1216, 1223,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615,
622 (1992) (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the issue facing the
Kelsey S. court).
19. Id at 830, 823 P.2d at 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
20. Id. at 821-22, 823 P. 2d at 1217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616; see infra notes 220-285 and
accompanying text (discussing the Kelsey S. case).
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unwed fathers.21 The statutory scheme was unconstitutional
because it permitted a mother to unilaterally preclude the natural
father from becoming a presumed father.22 If the unwed father
was not the presumed father in the eyes of the law, then the State
could terminate the father's parental rights merely by showing it
would be in the best interest of the child.23 Whether the United
States Supreme Court will eventually agree with the California
Supreme Court is uncertain.24 Furthermore, exactly what an
unwed father will have to do to gain the protection recognized by
the court is similarly uncertain.' Nevertheless, the California
Supreme Court's opinion could have both positive and negative
consequences for children, adoptive parents and unwed fathers,26
This Note examines the federal constitutional rights of putative
fathers in California after Kelsey S. Part I discusses the emergence
of federal constitutional rights for unwed fathers to develop a
relationship with their children born out of wedlock.27 Part II
summarizes the facts and procedural history behind Kelsey S. and
reviews the majority and concurring opinions.28 Finally, Part II
considers the legal ramifications flowing from the California
Supreme Court's decision.29
21. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635; see infra note 17
(outlining California Civil Code section 7004).
22. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
23. Id. Under a best interest of the child standard, the judge considers the alternative outcomes
and then chooses the alternative that maximizes what is best for the child. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of lndeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
226,255-68 (1975), reprinted in RoBERT H. MNooKrN & D. KmLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND
STATE 636-37 (2d ed. 1989). The judge might consider factors such as whether an award of custody
to the parent would be detrimental to the child, whether placement to a third person is essential to
avert harm to the child, and whether termination of parental rights is the least detrimental alternative.
MARY G. HOLBROOK, CAL. FAMILY LAw SERV. § 51:22 (Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1986).
24. See infra notes 291-303 and accompanying text (discussing whether the United States
Supreme Court can be expected to adopt the logic of the California Supreme Court in Kelsey S.).
25. See infra notes 304-343 and accompanying text (reviewing what the putative father might
do to show his commitment to his parental responsibilities).
26. See infra notes 344-355 and accompanying text (discussing the possible effects of the
Kelsey S. holding on children, adoptive parents, and putative fathers).
27. See infra notes 36-219 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 220-285 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 286-355 and accompanying text.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A unifying theme has emerged from United States Supreme
Court cases addressing the rights of unwed fathers.30 The Court
has recognized the biological link between a father and his child as
deserving of protection under the United States Constitution, so
long as the father takes advantage of his opportunity to develop a
full and lasting relationship with his child.3 In order to appreciate
the California Supreme Court's decision in Kelsey S., it is
necessary to first briefly review specific case law developed by the
United States Supreme Court and by California courts.
A. The Development of Constitutional Rights for Unwed
Fathers
Traditionally, the natural father of a child born out of wedlock
could not legally assert parental rights if the mother wished to
place the child for adoption. 2 Only the consent of the mother was
necessary to make a child available for adoption. 3 Since 1972,
however, the law affecting an unwed father's parental rights has
changed drastically, as a result of several decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.' The first United States Supreme Court
case to recognize federal constitutional due process and equal
30. See In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387,401,559 N.F.2d 418,424,559 N.Y.S.2d 855,
861 (N.Y. 1990) (recognizing that when an unwed father promptly commits himself to his parental
responsibility, he is entitled to federal constitutional due process and equal protection guarantees);
see also infra notes 36-148 and accompanying text (reviewing United States Supreme Court cases
which establish the theme that an unwed father who develops a relationship with his child is
protected by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution).
31. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 838, 823 P.2d 1216, 1228, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615,
627 (1992); see infra notes 36-148 and accompanying text (reviewing the United States Supreme
Court cases which establish the constitutional rights of unwed fathers in adoption matters).
32. CLARK, supra note 3, § 21.2, at 572-73; see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 668 (1971)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting) (describing the United States Supreme Court's decision as one which
embarked on an innovative concept of the natural law for unwed fathers); Kisthardt, supra note 7,
at 595 (discussing the traditional position of unwed fathers in the court and that position's
relationship in the expanding recognition of the constitutional rights of such fathers).
33. CLARK, supra note 3, § 21.2, at 572-73.
34. See infra notes 36-148 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme
Court cases that have helped to define the constitutionally protected rights of an unwed father).
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protection rights for unwed fathers was the landmark case of
Stanley v. Illinois.
3 5
1. The Recognition of An Unwed Father's Due Process
Rights: Stanley v. Illinois
In Stanley v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court first
made clear that unwed fathers had federal constitutional rights of
equal protection and due process, at least where the mother and
father had lived together with their children.36 Joan and Peter
Stanley had lived together intermittently over an eighteen year
period without marrying.37 During that period they had three
children.38 When Joan died, Stanley's children were taken from
him in accordance with Illinois law, which required that children
of unwed mothers became wards of the State upon the death of the
mother.39 Stanley argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights to
due process and equal protection were violated by the Illinois
statutes because he was never shown to be an unfit parent, due to
his status as an unwed father.4"
35. 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
36. See id. at 651 (recognizing the private interest of a man who has sired and raised his
children must be protected absent a strong countervailing State interest).
37. Id. at 646.
38. Id.
39. Id. Under Illinois law, children were required to be wards of the State if they had no
surviving parent or guardian. Id. at 649; see ILL REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-1,702-5 (1965) (repealed
and reenacted by P.A. 85-601, effective January 1, 1988) (current version at ILL REv. STAT. ch. 37,
§§ 802-1, 803-1, 804-1, 805-1, 802-4 (1990)). Under the statutory definition, a "parent" included a
mother or father of a legitimate child, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, or adoptive
parents. ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-14 (1965) (repealed and reenacted by P.A. 85-601, effective
January 1, 1988) (current version at ILL REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 801-3 (1990)).
40. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646 (noting that married fathers and unwed mothers could lose their
parental rights only on a showing of unfitness). The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution reads: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment restricts the actions of the
federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. V; See JOHN E. NovAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSrU-rrONAL LAw § 11.4, at 374 (4th ed. 1991). The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause restricts the ability of state and local governments to classify people for the allocation of
benefits or burdens. Id. § 11.4, at 374-75. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply to the federal government, but the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has an implied equal protection guarantee which limits the federal
1638
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The United States Supreme Court held that the Illinois statute
deprived Stanley of his right to procedural due process.'"
Recognizing the importance of the family, the majority found that
Stanley had an undeniable and powerful private interest in retaining
custody of the children he had raised.42 The State had a legitimate
interest in protecting the welfare of minor children, but the means
of achieving that end also had to be constitutionally defensible.43
If Stanley was shown to be a fit father, then the State's interest in
caring for his children would be insignificant.' It was insufficient
to presume that Stanley was unfit merely as an administrative
convenience to the State.45 Stanley was entitled to a hearing on
his parental fitness before his children could be taken away from
government's ability to classify persons for the allocation of benefits or burdens. Id. § 11.4, at 374;
see infra notes 41, 63, 67 (discussing the protections set forth in the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause).
41. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649; see NOWAK, supra note 40, §10.6, at 338-39 (4th ed. 1991).
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, each citizen has a
right to a fair decision-making process before the government may directly impair the individual's
life, liberty or property. U.S. CONS'r. amends. V, XIV. In determining whether an individual has been
deprived of procedural due process, a court must first determine if there is any requirement for a
procedure by looking at whether life, liberty or property is being deprived. Id. § 13.8, at 525. If one
of these interests is not at stake, the State may deny privileges to individuals without a hearing. Id.
§ 13.2, at 491. A person's liberty has been deprived where he loses significant freedom of action or
is denied a fundamental right provided by the Constitution. Id. § 13.4, at 496. If a court finds a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property, it must then determine what procedures are required to
provide fairness. Id. § 13.8, at 530. The court uses a three-factor balancing to ascertain which
procedures are required. Id. On the side of the individual, the court looks at the importance of the
individual liberty or property interest at stake and the extent to which the requested procedure may
reduce the possibility of erroneous decision-making. Id. § 13.8, at 531. On the other side of the
balance, the court considers the State interest in avoiding the increased administrative and fiscal
burdens which are the result of increased procedural requirements. Id.
42. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651; see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing
the liberty guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of an individual to establish
a home and raise children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that both
marriage and procreation are fundamental to "the very existence and survival of the race"); May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (finding that the right to care, custody, management and
companionship of minor children is more cherished than property rights); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (recognizing the traditional relations of family
as being as old and as fundamental as American civilization).
43. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
44. Id. at 657-58.
45. Id. at 658. The State insisted on presuming rather than proving Stanley's unfitness because
doing so was more convenient to the State. Id.
1639
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him.4 The Court held that parental unfitness had to be established
on the basis of individualized proof, rather than on a presumption
that unmarried fathers were unfit.47 Finally, the Court held that
denying a fitness hearing to an unwed father such as Stanley while
granting it to all other parents, was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.48 Six years later, the Court clarified Stanley by
further defining the nature of the relationship between the unwed
father and his child.49
2. Requiring More Than A Biological Link: Quilloin v.
Walcott and Caban v. Mohammed.
The Supreme Court further clarified the constitutional rights of
unwed fathers in Quilloin v. Walcott. 50 In Quilloin, the Court
emphasized the importance of the nature of the relationship
.between the father and his children in determining the degree of
constitutional protection to which the father was entitled."
Leon Quilloin and Ardell Williams Walcott gave birth to a child in
December 1964.52 Quilloin neither married Walcott nor lived with
the mother or the child.53 In September 1967, Walcott married
another man. 54 Twelve years after the child's birth, Walcott
consented to adoption of the child by her husband.55 Quilloin then
attempted to block the adoption of his biological child.56
46. Id. at 649.
47. Id. at 649-57.
48. Id. at 658. The Court devoted only seven sentences to the equal protection aspect of its
holding. Id.; see infra note 67 (discussing the manner in which a court analyzes equal protection
issues).
49. See Quilloin v. Waleott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (holding that the relationship between
parent and child is constitutionally protected); see also infra notes 50-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Quilloin).
50. 434 U.S. 246 (1977).
51. Id. at 255. See generally Zinman, supra note 2, at 975-77 (reviewing Quilloin).




56. Id. Quilloin sought visitation rights, but did not seek custody or object to the child
continuing to live with the Walcotts. Id. Prior to his attempt to block the adoption, Quilloin had
provided support only on an irregular basis. Id. at 251. Under Georgia law, the father had a duty to
1640
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Quilloin argued Georgia's adoption laws violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection." Under
Georgia law, the father was required to legitimate his child by
marrying the mother and acknowledging the child as his own or by
obtaining a court order declaring the child legitimate and capable
of inheriting from the father.58 Quilloin claimed that the Georgia
statutes denied him the rights granted to married parents and
presumed unwed fathers to be unfit parents as a matter of law.59
The trial court found that the proposed adoption was in the child's
best interest and determined that Quilloin's constitutional claims
were without merit.' Therefore, the trial court granted the
adoption petition without finding Quilloin to be an unfit parent.6
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the decision.62
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court first held the
substantive due process rights of an unwed father were not violated
by application of a "best interest of the child" standard in
determining if an adoption should go forward when the father had
never sought custody of his child.63 The Court recognized both
support his child, but the mother had never brought an action to enforce this duty. Id. at 251 n.9; see
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101 (1975). Therefore, since Quilloin had never been ordered to pay support,
this ground alone could not be used to deny Qiilloin veto authority over the adoption. Quilloin, 434
U.S. at 248-50. Also, Quilloin had not petitioned for legitimation of the child until the adoption
petition by Walcott. Id. at 249.
57. Id. at 248-50.
58. Id. at 249; see GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-101, 74-103, 74-403 (1975). If the child was not
legitimated, the mother had exclusive authority to consent to the child's adoption. Id at 248.
59. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 250.
60. Id. at 251-52.
61. Id. at 252.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 255; see NowAK, supra note 40, § 114, at 369. Substantive due process review
involves a judicial determination of whether the substance of the law or governmental action agrees
with the Constitution. Id. § 10.6, at 339. The court must first make a determination of the type of law
or action involved. Id. § 11.4, at 370. The standard applied by the court will differ depending on
whether an economic and social welfare matter or a fundamental right is involved. Id. Once the court
determines that a fundamental right is involved, the court then has the option of reviewing the law
under either a due process or an equal protection analysis. Id. Where a law involves a classification
relating only to economic or social welfare, a court will uphold the law so long as the classification
is rationally related to a legitimate interest of government. Id. If the law regulates the exercise of an
individual's fundamental rights, the court will subject the right to strict scrutiny. Id. § 11.4, at 370-7 1.
To survive under this standard, the classification involved must be necessary or narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling state interest. Id. § 11.4, at 371. A third standard of "intermediate review" is
1641
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the constitutionally protected relationship between parent and child
and the legitimate interest of the State in preserving existing family
units. 4 Quilloin's relationship with his child was not protected by
the Federal Constitution's implied fundamental right to privacy in
family matters since his relationship with his child had never
developed into a family relationship.65 Therefore, Quilloin was
entitled to no greater protection than he had already received in the
form of notice and an opportunity to be heard.'
Quilloin's claim that he had been denied equal protection was
also rejected by the Supreme Court.67 The Court held that
sometimes applied by the Court, particularly where the law burdens a classification of persons based
upon gender or illegitimacy. Id. § 11.4, at 378. This standard is less strict than the compelling interest
test but less deferential than the rational relationship test. Id.; see infra notes 41, 63, 67 (discussing
the rational relationship test used by the courts when looking at equal protection and due process
matters).
64. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); see Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (recognizing a unitary family as typified by the marital
family).
65. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255. The Court noted that a right to privacy in family matters exists
as one of the liberties protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). Moreover, the Court recognized
that the Due Process Clause would be violated if a state forced the breakup of a natural family, over
the objections of the parents and the children, unless the parents were shown to be unfit and it was
in the best interest of the children to break up the family. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)). In
Quilloin, however, the father had never had custody of the child and the proposed adoption would
give full recognition to a family unit then in existence. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255. See generally
Kisthardt, supra note 7, at 599 (discussing the Quilloin Court's due process analysis).
66. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255. The Court held that, under the circumstances, the State was not
required to find anything more than that the adoption, and the denial of legitimation, were in the
child's best interest. Id. See generally Kisthardt, supra note 7, at 599 (discussing the Quilloin Court's
due process analysis).
67. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256; see NoWAK, supra note 40. The right to equal protection
requires that the State treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. Id. § 10.7, at 349.
Before a law can be subjected to any form of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, it must be
shown that the law classifies persons in some manner. Id. § 14.4, at 591. The court then looks at
whether the distinction between these individuals is a legitimate one. Id. § 10.7, at 349. In matters
of general social welfare or economic legislation, the court will sustain the classification if it arguably
relates to a legitimate function of government. Id. Where the court finds fundamental rights or
liberties are at stake, it will apply strict scrutiny when reviewing the classification and the government
will be required to demonstrate that there is a close relationship between the classification and the
promotion of a compelling or overriding interest. Id. § 14.3, at 575. A strict scrutiny standard will
be applied to classifications based on race, national origin, or alienage. Id. § 14.3, at 576. The United
States Supreme Court has sometimes applied an intermediate level of scrutiny, particularly in
classifications involving gender or illegitimacy. Id. To be upheld by the court, such a classification
must be shown by the government to have a substantial relationship to an important governmental
1642
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Quilloin's interests were readily distinguishable from those of a
separated or divorced father who would have usually shouldered
some responsibility with respect to the day-to-day supervision,
protection, or care of the child.6" Quilloin had never exercised any
actual or legal custody over the child and had not taken on similar
responsibilities in raising the child.69 The majority found that
since the State had an interest in the welfare of the child, the State
could recognize this difference in commitment by fathers under any
standard of review.7" Therefore, the Georgia statutes did not deny
Quilloin his right to equal protection."
The United States Supreme Court concluded that Quilloin's
rights to due process and equal protection had not been violated
because he had failed to establish an appropriate level of
commitment to the child.72 The Court's holding illustrates that a
biological connection alone is insufficient to obtain the full,
constitutional rights of a parent.73 The unwed father must also
display concern for and commitment to the child.74 Two years
later, the Court upheld the Quilloin standards in the case of Caban
v. Mohammed.75
interest. Id.





73. Id.; see Kisthardt, supra note 7, at 600 (outlining the significance of Quilloin and the
necessity of some relationship beyond the biological link between father and child).
74. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256; see Kisthardt, supra note 7, at 600 (outlining the significance
of the Quilloin case). For further discussion of Quilloin, see generally Robert J. Levy, The Rights of
Parents, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 693; Michael A. Vaccari, Note, Unwed Fathers-Adoption-Foster
Care Agency Seeking Permission to Consent to Child's Adoption Need Not Always Grant Child's
Unwed Father Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard, 5 FoRHAM URB. LJ. 175 (1976); Patricia E.
Swanson, Note, Family Law--Voluntary Legitimation--Father Has No Absolute Right to Legitimate
Child Solely on Proof of Biological Fatherhood, 8 ST. MARY'S LJ. 392 (1976); Michael N. Kern,
Note, Unwed Fathers: An Analytical Survey of Their Parental Rights and Obligations, 1979 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1029; Steven E. Davis, Comment, Illegitimacy and the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Adoption
Proceeding After Quilloin v. Walcott, 12 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 383 (1979); Nancy S.
Anstaett, Comment, Parental Rights: The Putative Father, 18 WASHBURN UJ. 174 (1978).
75. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that when an unwed father
has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, any distinction between unwed mothers
and unwed fathers must serve an important government interest); see also infra notes 76-89 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in Caban).
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In Caban, Abdiel Caban, the father, and Maria Mohammed, the
mother, lived together for several years but were never married.76
The couple had two children, and Caban was listed on both birth
certificates as the father." Together with Mohammed, Caban
contributed to the support of the family.78 Eventually, he and
Mohammed separated and she took the children to live with her.79
Over the next two years, Caban saw the children frequently.80
Mohammed married and she and her husband petitioned for
adoption of the children; Caban and his new wife cross-petitioned
for adoption." A hearing was held and Mohammed's adoption
petition was granted despite Caban's refusal to consent to such an
adoption.8" When the issue reached the United States Supreme
Court, Caban argued that the distinction drawn in the New York
statute between the adoption rights of unwed fathers and other
parents violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution." He also argued that his substantive due process
rights had been violated by terminating his parental relationship
absent a showing that he was an unfit parent.8 4
76. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Mohammed and the children later lived with her new husband. Id.
80. Id. While the children lived with Mohammed, Caban saw them weekly when they would
visit their maternal grandmother. Id. Subsequently, Mohammed sent the children to live with her
mother who was moving to Puerto Rico and both Mohammed and Caban kept in touch with them.
Id. at 382-83. Approximately one year later, Caban went to visit the children in Puerto Rico and
returned to New York with them after the grandmother willingly surrendered them to Caban under
the impression that they would be returned to her within a few days. Id. at 383. After learning the
children were with Caban, Mohammed tried to retrieve them with the help of a police officer, but
she was unsuccessful. id. Mohammed then sought and obtained temporary custody and Caban
received visitation rights. Id.
81. Id. at 383.
82. id. at 383-84.
83. Id. at 385; see N.Y. DoM. REL LAw § 111 (MeKinney 1938) (amended 1985). New York
law provided that consent to adoption was required of parents of a child born in wedlock, of the
mother of a child born out of wedlock, and of any person having lawful custody of the adoptive
child. Id. The unwed father had no similar right under the statute to block the adoption. Id.; see also
supra note 67 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's method of analyzing equal protection
issues).
84. Caban, 441 U.S. at 385; see supra note 63 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
approach to analyzing substantive due process issues).
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The United States Supreme Court first held the New York
statute's distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers
violated Caban's equal protection rights. 5 The Court applied an
intermediate standard of review which required that gender-based
distinctions must serve an important governmental objective and
must be substantially related to achievement of that objective."
The majority held that New York's distinction between unwed
mothers and unwed fathers did not bear a substantial relation to the
State's interest in providing adoptive homes for its illegitimate
children.87 Even where an unwed father, such as Caban, had come
forward to participate in the child's rearing, the statute
discriminated against him on the basis of his sex.8" Because the
Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause, it did not review Caban's substantive due
process argument. 89
The different outcomes in Quilloin and Caban can be attributed
to the level of the relationship existing between father and child in
each of these cases.9' In Quilloin, the Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of the father's failure to participate in any aspect of
the rearing of his child.9 In Caban, the Court found that the
father had established a significant relationship with his children
and had admitted his paternity.92 Therefore, the Court's analysis
focused on the combination of biology and commitment to the
85. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.
86. Id. at 388; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives to withstand constitutional challenge).
87. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391.
88. Id. at 394.
89. Id. The Court stated that it had expressed no view as to whether a state could
constitutionally order adoption in the absence of a determination that the parent whose rights were
being terminated was unfit. Id.
90. Id. at 389 n.7. The Court noted that Quilloin emphasized the relationship between a father
and his children. Id.; see Quilloin v. Walcott 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (recognizing the father had
never shouldered any parental responsibility).
91. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7.
92. Id. at 393.
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paternal relationship. 3 Still unanswered, however, was how the
Court would decide a case involving a young child with whom the
father had no opportunity to form a relationship.
9 4
3. Establishing the Unwed Father's Right to Notice of His
Child's Pending Adoption: Lehr v. Robertson
In the 1983 case of Lehr v. Robertson,95 the United States
Supreme Court considered a case in which a father had never been
given an opportunity to form a relationship with his child. 6
Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Robertson lived together before the
birth of their daughter, Jessica.97 Lehr and Robertson were never
married, and after the birth of the child, the couple no longer lived
together. 8 Lehr was not listed on the birth certificate as the
father99 and never had any significant custodial, personal, or
financial relations with Jessica.'o t
93. For further discussion of Caban, see generally Rowland L. Young, Supreme Court Report:
Father of Illegitimate Wins in New York Case, 65 A.B.A. J. 953 (1979); Stephen J. Sturgill, Note,
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Parent and Child-Adoption--Unwed Father has Equal
Protection Right to Consent-Caban v. Mohammed, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REv. 987; Ronald R. Hofer,
Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Gender-Based Classifications in Adoptions Found
Violative, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 131 (1979); John T. Wright, Comment, Caban v. Mohammed:
Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 46 BROOKLYN L REV. 95 (1979); Richard Gutekunst,
Comment, An Analysis of the Unwed Father's Adoption Rights in Light of Caban v. Mohammed: A
Foundation in Federal Law for a Necessary Redrafting of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 25 ViLL.
L. RE%,. 317 (1979-80); Karen A. Koeppe, Comment, The Rights of Unwed Fathers Are Being
Violated Under California's Statutory Scheme in Light of the United States Supreme Court Decision
in Caban v. Mohammed, 23 SATA CLARA L. REV. 899 (1983); Juliann J. Sitoski, Comment,
Limiting the Boundaries of Stanley v. Illinois: Caban v. Mohammed, 57 DENV. U. L. REv. 671
(1980).
94. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that an unwed father who grasps his
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child must be afforded federal constitutional
protection). See generally Kisthardt, supra note 7, at 603-06 (considering the Lehr case and the issues
facing the United States Supreme Court).
95. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
96. Id. at 249-50.
97. Id. at 252.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 262. Lehr contended that the mother concealed the whereabouts of herself and the
child from Lehr for the two year period. Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting). Further, he contended that
he offered to provide financial assistance and to set up a trust fund for Jessica, but the mother
refused. Id,
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Eight months after Jessica's birth, Lorraine married Richard
Robertson, and in late 1978, the Robertsons filed an adoption
petition.' Lehr did not fall within the statutory definition of a
putative father, and therefore, received no notice of the adoption
proceeding."° Coincidentally, one month after the adoption
petition, Lehr filed an action for determination of paternity, an
order of support, and reasonable visitation rights.0 3 Lehr first
learned of the adoption proceeding when he received a change of
venue order concerning his paternity suit.'0 He attempted to have
the adoption proceeding stayed, but was informed by the judge that
the adoption had already been granted.0 5 Lehr's paternity action
was then dismissed on motion by the Robertsons.10 6 Lehr later
filed a petition to vacate the adoption order, however, this petition
was denied. 7 The appellate division and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the denial of Lehr's petition.' Before the
United States Supreme Court, Lehr claimed that the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution
afforded him an absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard before his child could be adopted." 9
In rejecting Lehr's arguments, the United States Supreme Court
first considered the nature of the private interest threatened by the
State's procedure."0 The Court recognized that an unwed father
had an interest in the parent-child relationship."' The Court also
noted a distinction between cases where the father had developed
a parent-child relationship and cases where the father had only a
101. Id. at 250.
102. Id. at 250-51. New York's statute created a "putative father registry" where a biological
father could register with the State to demonstrate his intent to claim paternity of a child born out
of wedlock. Id. at 251 n.4; see N.Y. Soc. SEtv. LAw § 372 (McKinney 1923) (amended 1992). Once
registered with the registry, the father was entitled to receive notice of any proceeding to adopt that
child. Id. Lehr had not entered his name in the registry. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-51.
103. Id. at 252.




108. Id. at 253-54.
109. Id. at 250.
110. Id. at 256.
Ill. Id.
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potential for a relationship." 2 The Court held that when an
unwed father demonstrated his full commitment to his parental
responsibilities by participating in the rearing of his child, his
interest in personal contact with the child warranted substantial
protection under the Due Process Clause." 3 The mere existence
of a biological link, however, was not enough to merit equivalent
constitutional protection.1 4 The New York statute protected
Lehr's interest as a putative father in establishing a relationship
with Jessica if he at least filed with the "putative father
registry.""15 Therefore, Lehr was not denied procedural due
process protection merely because the lower court strictly complied
with the notice provisions of the statute.1
1 6
The Supreme Court also denied Lehr's equal protection
claim. "7 The Court noted that in order to sustain a distinction
based on gender, the State needed to establish that a substantial
relationship existed between that distinction and some important
State purpose."' The State argued it had a substantial interest in
protecting the rights of children in adoption matters." 9
In agreeing with the State's argument, the majority held that if
one parent had an established custodial relationship with the child
and the other parent had either abandoned or never established a
relationship, the Equal Protection Clause did not prevent a state
from according the two parents different legal rights.' The
Court concluded that because Lehr had never established a
continuous custodial responsibility for Jessica, his right to equal
112. Id. at 261.
113. Id.; see supra notes 41, 63 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's approach to
analyzing due process matters).
114. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
115. Id. at 265.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 267-68; see supra note 67 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's approach
to analyzing equal protection matters).
118. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265-66.
119. Id. at 266.
120. Id. at 267-68.
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protection was not violated by New York's classification.'
Following its decision in Lehr, -the United States Supreme Court
next focused its attention on the case of an unwed father whose
child was conceived while the mother was married to another
man. 
122
4. Rebutting the Marital Presumption: Michael H. v.
Gerald D.
The Michael H. Court, in a plurality opinion, recognized that
where a child is born into an existing marital family, the putative
father's interest in a relationship with his child conflicts with the
interests of the man who is married to the mother.123 The
plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that it was not
unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to the
mother's husband.
12 1
Michael H. had an affair with Carole D., resulting in the birth
of Victoria D.12' At the time, Carole D. was married to and living
with Gerald D.126  Shortly after Victoria's birth, Carole told
121. Id. For further discussion of Lehr, see generally Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional
Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIo ST. L. J. 313 (1984); Nanette
Dembitz, Lehr Decision Helps Out-of-Wedlock Newborns Find Homes, 70 A.B.A. J. 126 (1984);
Richard Hoffman, Note, The Grudging and Crabbed Approach to Due Process for the Unwed
Father: Lehr v. Robertson, 16 CoNN. L REv. 571 (1984); Jennifer J. Raab, Comment, Lehr v.
Robertson: Unwed Fathers and Adoption-How Much Process is Due?, 7 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 265
(1984); John L. Roark, Note, Putative Father's Rights to Notice of Adoption Proceedings Involving
His Child, 49 Mo. L. REv. 650 (1984); Davida S. Scher, Note, Lehr v. Robertson, A Constricted
View of the Rights of Putative Fathers, 4 PACE L. REv. 477 (1984); Jane P. Perry, Note, Lehr v.
Robertson: Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Supreme Court Limits the Scope of the Putative
Father's Right to Notice, Hearing, and Consent in the Adoption of His Illegitimate Child, 15 U. TOL.
L. REv. 1501 (1984); Note, Adoption-Due Process and Equal Protection Do Not Require that the
Natural Father ofan Illegitimate Child Receive Notice ofAdoption Proceeding Where the Father Has
Failed to Support Child or to Place his Name on State's Putative Father Registry, 22 J. FAm. L. 364
(1984).
122. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see also Kisthardt, supra note 7, at
607 (reviewing the United States Supreme Court's cases and setting up the issue present in Michael
H.).
123. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 113.
126. Id.
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Michael that Victoria was probably his daughter."' Victoria and
CaroJe then lived intermittently with Michael, Gerald, and a third
man.12 ' While the mother and daughter lived with Michael, he
held Victoria out as his daughter." 9 Subsequently, Carole left
Michael, and he sought visitation and paternity rights over
Victoria.13
Gerald D. intervened in the action and filed a motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that there was no triable issue
of fact as to Victoria's paternity.'3 ' The trial court granted
summary judgment based on the conclusive presumption in
California Evidence Code section 621.132 The presumption stated
that where the mother of the unwed father's child was married to
another man at the time of conception, the marital husband was
conclusively presumed to be the father if he was not impotent or
sterile. 33 On appeal, Michael challenged the constitutionality of
Evidence Code section 621, arguing that his procedural and
substantive due process rights had been violated." 4 The Court of
Appeal for the Second District of California upheld the denial of
Michael's claim, and the California Supreme Court denied
discretionary review.
135
In a plurality decision, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeal for the Second District of




130. Id. at 114-15. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian, also sought visitation rights
for Michael contingent upon the determination of the pending lawsuit. Id.
131. Id. Gerald argued that under California Evidence Code section 621, there was no triable
issue of fact as to Victoria's paternity since he and the mother were married at the time of the child's
birth and he was neither impotent nor sterile. Id.; see infra note 132 (summarizing California
Evidence Code section 621).
132. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115; see 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 1180, sec. 1, at 4760 (amending CAL.
EVW. CODE § 621) (establishing that the marital husband is conclusively presumed to ba the father
of the child when the mother is living with the marital husband who is neither impotent nor sterile).
Effective January 1, 1994, the statute will appear at California Family Code section 7500. 1992 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 546 (West).
133. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115.
134. Id. at 115-16.
135. Id. at 116.
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California. 3 6 The Court first rejected Michael's claim that his
procedural due process rights had been violated. 37 According to
the plurality, the implementation of the irrebuttable presumption
contained in the California Evidence Code was not a procedural
rule.'38 Rather, it was a substantive rule of law which treated the
actual circumstances of paternity as irrelevant when a child was
born to a married woman.1 39 The Court said the focus was not on
the adequacy of the procedures, but on whether the "fit" between
the classification involved and the policy that classification served
was adequate. 4' Therefore, the Court rejected the procedural due
process argument and moved on to Michael's substantive due
process challenge.'41
Michael also claimed that his substantive due process rights had
been violated by the California statute. 42 Michael argued that
because he had established a relationship with Victoria, his liberty
interest in a parental relationship could not be terminated merely
to protect Carole's current marital union. 4 3 In addressing this
argument, the plurality noted that in order for Michael's liberty
interest to be fundamental, it had to be an interest traditionally
protected by society.'" The Court looked at whether relationships
136. Id. at 132.
137. Id. at 119, 121. Michael complained that the State had terminated his liberty interest in
his relationship with Victoria without affording him the opportunity to establish his paternity at an
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 119; see supra notes 41, 63 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
method for evaluating due process challenges to state statutes).
138. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119.
139. Id: See generally Kisthardt, supra note 7, at 616 (discussing the plurality opinion of
Michael H.).
140. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121. The plurality noted that several commentators and previous
cases had recognized that the Court's irrebuttable presumption cases turned on this standard. Id. at
120-21. Since the Court did not rule on the procedural due process claim, left unresolved is the issue
of what types of procedures, if any, need to be given to a male who asserts that he is the biological
father of an illegitimate child. NOWAK, supra note 40, at 507 (discussing the ramifications of Michael
H. on due process requirements when the mother is not married at the time the child is born).
141. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 121;see supra notes 41,63 (discussing the United States Supreme
Court's test for evaluating due process challenges to state statutes).
142. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121.
143. Id. The plurality noted that a traditional policy reason for a presumption in favor of the
marital union was to protect the State's interest in promoting peace and tranquillity within the State
and families. Id. at 125.
144. Id. at 122.
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such as the one between Michael and Victoria had historically been
treated as a protected family unit. 45
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, found that the marital
family had traditionally been protected against a claim such as
Michael's. 46 Therefore, the Court concluded that Michael did not
have a protected liberty interest in a parental relationship with
Victoria. 147 The Michael H. plurality established that the
constitutionally protected interest of an unwed father to develop a
relationship with his child could be limited when exercising that
interest would conflict with the interests of a marital husband.1
48
In addition to the United States Supreme Court decisions outlined
above, California has developed its own case law acknowledging
the parental rights of unwed fathers. 41
145. Id. at 124. To distinguish Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr, the Supreme Court held
that those cases did not rest on the notion that a biological connection plus a developed relationship
created a liberty interest. Id. at 123. Instead, the Michael H. Court held that these prior decisions
rested upon the relationships that develop in a unitary family, recognized by the plurality as being
typified by the marital family. Id. at 123 n.3. The Court acknowledged that the concept could be
extended to include households of unmarried parents and children, but not a relationship such as that
between Michael, Carole, and Victoria. Id.
146. Id. at 124.
147. Id. at 127.
148. Id. 128-29. Since Michael had in fact established a relationship with Victoria, the Court's
holding seems to contradict earlier rulings establishing a putative father's constitutional right where
the father had established a relationship with his child. See id.; Zinman, supra note 2, at 980
(discussing the apparent contradiction of the Michael H. Court while implying the support of at least
four Justices for the traditional rule obviates such a contradiction). Still, four Justices agreed that the
biological father had a protected liberty interest in his relationship with his child. Michael H., 4916
U.S. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 159-60 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens assumed that
Michael had a protected interest for the purposes of the case since there was a biological connection
between Michael and Victoria and Michael had established a relationship with his child. Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, L, concurring in judgment).
149. See In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918,207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984); Michael
U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 CaL Rptr. 39 (1985); Adoption of Marie R., 79
Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (2d Dist. 1978); W. B. J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d
303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (2d Dist. 1979); Jermstad v. McNelis, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 258 Cal. Rptr.
519 (3d Dist. 1989) (acknowledging federal constitutional protection for putative fathers); see infra
notes 153-216, 261 and accompanying text (reviewing California case law relevant to the Kelsey S.
decision).
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B. California Case Law Acknowledging Federal Constitutional
Protection for Unwed Fathers
The California Supreme Court acknowledged that because
Kelsey S. presented a federal constitutional question, the California
court was required to adhere to the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.15 Nonetheless, the Court looked to relevant
California decisions for additional guidance.51 The majority
recognized that the California cases did not provide a clear answer
to the question presented in Kelsey S, but found that the cases
reflected an acknowledgement of federal constitutional protection
for putative fathers.
1 12
1. Recognizing the Parental Preference Under Federal
Constitutional Law: In re Baby Girl M.
The California Supreme Court in In re Baby Girl M.153 held
that when a mother relinquishes custody of her child and the
natural father claims custody at a hearing, a finding of detriment to
the child is necessary to terminate the father's parental rights. 154
In Baby Girl M., the mother and natural father dated for a brief
period during the fall of 1980.15 The mother became pregnant,
but the couple separated before the father was aware of the
pregnancy.'56 Following the birth, and while in the hospital, the
mother requested adoption assistance and placed the child in a
foster home. 157 The father first learned of the birth two weeks
later."'8 He contacted the city's department of social welfare and
expressed a desire to have the child placed in the home of a family
150. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 839, 823 P.2d 1216, 1229, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615,
628 (1992).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 839-40, 823 P.2d at 1230, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629.
153. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
154. Id. at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
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he knew. 159 Later that day, the mother formally relinquished the
child for adoption and rejected the father's placement request,
saying she preferred that the child be placed vith a family neither
she nor the father knew.1 60 A few days later, a petition was filed
under California Civil Code section 7017 to terminate the father's
parental rights.161 Despite the father's wishes, the child was
placed with prospective adoptive parents about two weeks
later.162 At the hearing required under section 7017, the father's
parental rights were terminated by the trial court. 63 Although the
court found that the father could have been a good parent, it
nonetheless felt it was in the child's best interest to remain with the
adoptive parents.'" Therefore, the biological father's parental
rights were severed without a finding it would be detrimental to the
child for him to have custody. 65
The California Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in
severing the father's parental rights without first looking at the
possible detriment to the child.' The court concluded that the
State could not deny biological parents the opportunity to establish
a protected custodial relationship with their children in the absence
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The written opinion does not specify who filed the petition. Id. Under California Civil
Code section 7017, an adoption could not be completed, even after the mother had relinquished her
child, until a petition was granted terminating the natural father's rights. Id. at 69 n.2, 688 P.2d at
920-21 n.2, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311-12 n.2. The father was entitled to notice of the hearing unless he
had given a previous written waiver. Id. at 69, 688 P.2d at 920., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311. If the father
appeared at the hearing and claimed custody rights, the court had to determine those rights. Id.; see
1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 752, sec. 2, at 2608-09 (amending CAL. CIV. CODa § 7017) (providing that an
adoption may not be completed, even after the mother has relinquished her child, until a petition is
granted terminating the natural father's rights). Effective January 1, 1994, the statute will appear at
California Family Code sections 7660-7670. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 552 (West).




166. Id. at 67-68, 688 P.2d at 919-20, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11. The court's statutory analysis
is not particularly helpful to this Note since the Legislature amended section 7017 two years after the
Baby Girl M. decision. See 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1370, sec. 2, at 4903 (amending CAL. Ctv. CODE §
7017); Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 840, 823 P.2d 1216, 1230, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 629
(1992) (discussing the Legislature's response to Baby Girl M.). Additionally, the California Supreme
Court suggested in dicta that a parental preference was required as a matter of federal constitutional
law. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 74-75, 688 P.2d at 924-25, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16.
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of unfitness. 67 In addition to decisions of the California Supreme
Court addressing the rights of unwed fathers prior to Kelsey S.,
various California appellate courts had considered issues relating
to unwed fathers' rights.168
2. Decisions of the California Courts of Appeal Relating
to the Rights of Unwed Fathers
In Adoption of Marie R.,169 the Court of Appeal for the
Second District of California held that at least some minimal
contact between the father and his child was required for the
unwed father to be a presumed father. 7' Sheila, the mother,
became pregnant after she engaged in separate acts of intercourse
with two men, Charles and Scott.17 ' The child, Marie was born
on January 11, 1976.172 Sheila and Scott were married three days
before Marie's birth.173 Although Scott was listed as the father on
Marie's birth certificate, Sheila also let Charles assume that he was
the biological father. 74 Immediately after Marie's birth, Sheila
and Scott placed the child with a couple, Ronald and Jill K., with
whom Marie thereafter continuously lived. 75 Charles filed a
complaint to establish paternity. 76 Ronald and Jill subsequently
filed a petition for adoption and initiated an action under Civil
167. Id. Another case discussed by the Kelsey S. court was Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d
787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985), which the court felt was of little help to the
constitutional issue presented in Kelsey S. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 841, 823 P.2d at 1231, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 630. The majority opined that since there was no majority opinion in the Michael U. case, none
of the four opinions had any precedential value. Kelsey S. at 841, 823 P.2d at 1230, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 629. Also, the Legislature's later amendment of section 7017 abrogated the court's decision. Id.
at 841, 823 P.2d at 1231, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630.
168. See infra notes 169-216, 261 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions of
California appellate courts on the rights of unwed fathers).
169. 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (2d Dist. 1978).
170. Id. at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
171. Id. at 626, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 123. The facts in the written opinion are somewhat sparse as
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Code section 7017 to have Charles' parental rights terminated.'
The trial court permitted Charles to offer evidence as to paternity,
but blood tests were inconclusive to prove the identity of the
biological father.'78 Additionally, the trial court found that
Charles had not contributed to Sheila's prenatal support, the
expense of the birth, or post-birth expenses, although he had
offered to provide such support. 79
The trial court held that Charles had established constructive
receipt of his child, and that actual receipt had been prevented by
the mother.' The constructive receipt argument rested on the
theory that if Charles had done all that he could to receive his child
into his home but had been blocked by the mother from actually
receiving his child, the court should infer or imply that he had
established constructive receipt.' Since the trial court found that
Charles had constructively received his child into his home, he had
acquired the rights of a legally presumed father, and the adoption
petition was not able to move forward without his consent.
182
Sheila and Scott appealed to the Court of Appeal for the Second
District of California.
83
In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeal for the
Second District of California held that without at least some
minimal contact with the child, Civil Code section 7004 did not
permit the putative father to claim he had taken the child into his
home, constructively or otherwise. 84  The Marie R. court
recognized that as a result of the United States Supreme Court's
177. Id.; see 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 207, sec. 2, at 729-30 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017)
(providing that an adoption may not be completed, even after the mother has relinquished her child,
until a petition is granted terminating the natural father's rights). Effective January 1, 1994, the statute
will appear at California Family Code sections 7660-7670. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10,
at 552-54 (West); see also supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing California Civil Code
section 7017).
178. Marie R, 79 Cal. App. 3d at 626, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 626, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
181. See id. at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126; BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 313 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining -constructive" as something inferred or implied by legal interpretation).
182. Marie R, 79 Cal. App. 3d at 626-27, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
183. Id. at 627, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
184. See id. at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126 (holding constructive receipt was not allowed).
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holding in Quilloin v. Walcott, a state could draw a distinction
between a statutorily presumed father and a putative father. 
1 5
Such a distinction allowed the court to deny the putative father the
right to withhold consent to his child's adoption."8 6 This was true
even if the putative father had promptly done all he could to fulfill
his responsibilities as a parent, but was prevented by the mother
from actually receiving the child into his home.187
In the case of W. E. J. v. Superior Court,18 8 the Court of
Appeal for the Second District of California once again upheld a
statutory distinction between natural and presumed fathers.8 9 In
W. E. J., the court found that a broadly worded statutory distinction
between natural and presumed fathers was constitutionally valid
under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. 9" In W. E. J., the baby's mother, Ms. G., released
her child to the prospective adoptive parents the day after his
birth. 9 ' The biological father, F.L., was married to another
woman at the time of conception and trial. 92 He appeared at the
adoption proceeding and sought custody.' 93 F.L. argued that a
biological father was entitled to custody of his child born out of
wedlock, both by reason of constitutional principles articulated in
Caban v. Mohammed94 and in order to qualify as a presumed
185. Id. at 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 125; see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)
(holding that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected); see also supra
notes 50-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Quilloin case).
186. Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
187. Id. at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
188. 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (2d Dist. 1979).
189. Id. at 305-06, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864. The court of appeal noted in its decision that the
entire file of the superior court had not been brought up and therefore the facts surrounding the case
are vague. Id.
190. Id. at 314-15, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869; see 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 429, sec. 36, at 1349-50
(amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017) (providing that an adoption may not be completed, even after
the mother has relinquished her child, until a petition is granted terminating the natural father's
rights). Effective January 1, 1994, the statute will appear at California Family Code sections 7660-
7670. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 552-54 (West).
191. W . J., 100 Cal. App. 3d at 306, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,382 (1979) (holding that when an unwed father
has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, any distinction between unwed mothers
and unwed fathers must serve an important governmental interest); see also supra notes 76-89 and
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father under the statute."' 5 The trial court found he was entitled
to custody, and without a finding of the child's best interest,
directed the prospective adoptive parents to release the baby to
F.L. 196 Thereafter, the prospective adoptive parents appealed.197
The Court of Appeal for the Second District of California
ordered the lower court to vacate its decision and conduct a new
hearing.'98 The court identified a gender-based classification in
Civil Code section 7017.1' The majority noted, however, that the
statute did not discriminate between all unwed mothers and all
unwed fathers." 0 Instead, the statute's classification distinguished
unmarried mothers from unmarried fathers who had neither married
the mother nor lived with the child as a parent.20 1 The court
found such a distinction to be based upon an actual difference in
situation between the two classes since an unwed mother could not
be a stranger to her child.202 The State interest involved was the
protection of the child, which the court deemed to be
"important. ' 20 3 Applying the intermediate standard of review, the
court held that the limited classification was constitutional since the
distinction between natural and presumed fathers was substantially
related to an important State interest.2' The court therefore
concluded that the California statute was valid under the Federal
Constitution.05
accompanying text (discussing the Caban case in detail).
195. W. E J., 100 Cal. App. 3d at 306, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
196. Id. at 306-07, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
197. Id. at 306, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
198. Id. at 315, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
199. Id. at 314, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
200. Id. The court relied on Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), for the standard to be
applied in gender based discrimination. W. E. J., at 100 Cal. App. 3d at 314, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869;
see supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Caban holding).
201. W. E. J., 100 Cal. App. 3d at 314, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
202. Id. at 315, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869. The clear implication of the court is that an unwed father
who has never married the mother nor lived with the child as a parent would be a stranger to the
child. See id.
203. Id. at 314, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
204. IcL at 315, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869; see supra note 67 (discussing the approach of the courts
in equal protection matters).
205. W. E J., 100 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
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The Court of Appeal for the Third District of California
reviewed a case involving the rights of an unwed father.206 In
Jermstad v. McNelis, the court interpreted federal constitutional
principles of due process and equal protection to hold that a state
could not deny a biological parent the opportunity to establish a
protected relationship with his or her child.2 °7 In Jermstad, the
putative father was a merchant marine who learned at sea that the
woman he had been dating was pregnant.20 8 Upon his return, they
discussed their options for handling the pregnancy.2 9 The mother
wanted to place the child with adoptive parents.210 The father was
opposed to adoption, but felt he could not gain custody because of
his type of employment.2 ' The father visited the baby the day it
was born and announced he would seek custody. 2 2 At trial, the
court determined he was the father and awarded him custody of his
child.213
The Court of Appeal for the Third District of California
affirmed the lower court decision. 14 The appellate court noted
that a biological father had a constitutionally recognized parental
preference to custody of this child where he had diligently pursued
an opportunity to establish a custodial relationship. 215 The trial
court could grant sufficient custody to the father so that he could
take the child into his home and establish himself as a presumed
father, assuming it was in the best interest of the child.21 6
The preceding cases represent the relevant case law discussed
in the Kelsey S. opinion. From these cases, the Kelsey S. court
206. See Jermstad v. McNelis, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (3d Dist. 1989).
207. Id. at 550, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
208. Id. at 533, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
209. Id. at 533, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 521. The couple discussed the possibilities of marriage or
living together, along with the option of adoption. Rd.
210. Id.
211. Id. The father indicated that he wanted to have custody of the child, but the mother said
if he fought for custody against the proposed adoptive parents, she would keep the child herself. Id.
The father then told the prospective adoptive parents he would not contest the adoption. Id.
212. Id. at 534, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
213. Id. at 536-37, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23.
214. Id. at 554, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
215. Id. at 533, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
216. Id. at 543, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
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extracted a set of guiding constitutional principles.217  The
unifying theme which emerged was that the biological connection
between a father and his child is a unique relationship which
warrants federal constitutional protection.2"8  Before he receives
such protection, however, the father must attempt to develop that
biological connection into a full and lasting relationship.219 It was
with such a theme in mind that the California Supreme Court
granted review of Kelsey S.
II. THE CASE
A. The Factual and Procedural History
Kari S. (Kari) gave birth to Kelsey, a boy, on May 18,
1988.22o Kelsey's undisputed natural father was petitioner Rickie
M. (Rickie), who was not married to Kar. 221 Rickie was aware
Kari wanted to place Kelsey up for adoption and objected to the
decision.222 Two days after the child was born, Rickie filed an
action in the Superior Court of California in and for the County of
Santa Clara to establish his parental relationship with the child and
to obtain custody. 223 The court issued a restraining order that
temporarily awarded care, custody, and control of the child to
Rickie, stayed all adoption proceedings, and prohibited any contact
between the child and the prospective adoptive parents.224
217. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 830, 823 P.2d 1216, 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615,
622 (1992).
218. Id. at 838, 823 P.2d at 1228, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627. The court noted that the New York
Court of Appeals supported the idea of such a theme in the case of In re Raquel Marie X., 559
N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990). Id. at 838, 823 P.2d at 1228, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
221. Id.
222. Id. Rickie wanted to raise Kelsey himself. Id.
223. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1217-18, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616-17.
224. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. Although Rickie filed a copy of the
order with law enforcement officials, he was unsuccessful in serving the prospective adoptive parents
and never obtained custody of Kelsey. Id. Rickie claimed that the prospective adoptive parents
attempted to evade service of the order by secretly removing Kelsey from their house. Id. at 823, 823
P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. The adoptive parents did not directly dispute the allegations.
Id.
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On May 24, 1988, Steven and Suzanne A. (Steven and
Suzanne), the prospective adoptive parents, filed an adoption
petition.2' They alleged that only the mother's consent was
needed because there was no presumed father within the definition
of California Civil Code section 7004(a).226 On May 26, 1988,
the superior court modified its May 20, 1988 order and awarded
temporary custody of the child to Karl.22 7 On May 31, 1988,
Steven and Suzanne filed a petition under California Civil Code
section 7017 to terminate Rickie's parental rights.228
The trial court first ruled that Rickie was not a presumed father
within the meaning of section 7004(a)(4).229 The court next held
hearings to determine whether it was in Kelsey's best interest for
Ricde to retain his parental rights.230 On August 26, 1988, the
court found by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in
Kelsey's best interest to terminate his natural father's parental
rights.23' As a result of the court's judgment, Rickie was
prevented from blocking the adoption by Steven and Suzanne.232
Rickie appealed the lower court's decision, claiming the lower
court erred by concluding that he was not the child's presumed
father, by not allowing him to express his preference in his son's
adoption placement, and by applying a preponderance of the
225. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
226. Id.; see 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 192, sec. 1, at 1155-56 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004)
(detailing that an unwed father is a presumed father if he has lived with the mother or taken his child
into his home). Effective January 1, 1994, the statute will appear at California Family Code section
7611. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 549 (West). Since Rickie and Kari were not married
and Rickie had not taken Kelsey into his home, Steven and Suzanne argued the presumption did not
arise. See Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 823, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617; see also supra note
17 (summarizing California Civil Code section 7004).
227. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 822, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
228. Id. at 823, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. The trial court allowed Rickie
supervised visitation rights, and the prospective adoptive parents unsupervised visitation rights. Id.;
see 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 1363, see. 9, at 53 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017) (AB 3532) (providing
that an adoption may not be completed, even after the mother has relinquished her child, until a
petition is granted terminating the natural father's rights). Effective January 1, 1994, the statute will
appear at California Family Code sections 7660-7670. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 552
(West); see also supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing section 7017).
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evidence standard of proof.233 Each of his contentions was
rejected by the court of appeal which affirmed the judgment of the
lower court. 234 The California Supreme Court granted review.
23 5
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Baxter, writing for the majority in Kelsey S., reversed
the trial court and remanded the case to the Superior Court of
California in and for the County of Santa Clara for further
proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.236 The majority
first looked at whether the language of California Civil Code
section 7004 or the legislative history of the statute supported the
argument that a putative father could become a statutory presumed
father by virtue of constructive receipt of his child.23 The court
then analyzed whether federal constitutional rights of equal
protection and due process protected a putative father's parental
rights if he had demonstrated a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities.238
The majority first addressed Rickie's argument that the court
should construe California Civil Code section 7004 to provide him
with constructive receipt of his son where his attempts to receive
Kelsey into his home had been blocked by the courts, the mother,
and the adoptive parents. 9 The court considered whether section
7004 supported the theory of constructive receipt, and concluded
it did not.2' On its face, Civil Code section 7004(a) referred
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
236. Id. at 852, 823 P.2d at 1238, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637. Justice Baxter was joined by Chief
Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian and George. Id. at 852, 853 P.2d at 1239,4 Cal,
Rptr. 2d at 638.
237. Id. at 825-27, 823 P.2d at 1220-21, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619-20; Constructive receipt
involves the father's unsuccessful attempt to receive his child into his home in order to be considered
a presumed father. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of constructive
receipt of a child); see also infra notes 239-245 and accompanying text (discussing the court's review
of the constructive receipt argument).
238. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 830-39, 823 P.2d at 1223-29, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622-28.
239. ld. at 825, 823 P.2d at 1220, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
240. Id. at 826, 823 P.2d at 1220, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
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explicitly to actual receipt of the child into the father's home.241
The majority found neither explicit nor implied reference within
section 7004 to an unwed father's ability to become a presumed
father by attempted or constructive receipt of his child.242 The
court refused to insert words into the statute in order to interpret it
as Rickie had argued.243 Justice Baxter also reviewed California
case law and found little guidance on the constructive receipt
theory of an unwed father seeking to be considered a presumed
father by the courts.2' Therefore, the California Supreme Court
refused to construe the statutes to provide for constructive receipt
of the child as a method of becoming a presumed father.245
The California Supreme Court further held that California Civil
Code section 7004(a) and the related statutory scheme violated
federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due
process for unwed fathers. 246 The statute allowed a mother to
241. Id.; California Civil Code section 7004 subsection (a)(4) provided a man was presumed
to be the natural father of a child if, "He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
child as his natural child." 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 192, sec. 1, at 1155-56 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE §
7004); see supra note 17 and accompanying text (reviewing section 7004).
242. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 826, 823 P.2d at 1220, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
243. Id. at 827,823 P.2d at 1220,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619-20. The court stated that inserting the
words "receives or attempts to receive" into the statute would violate the generally accepted rule that
courts may not add provisions to a statute. Id. With the added words, California Civil Code section
7004 subsection (a) would have read: "A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if...
(4) He receives, or attempts to receive, the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child."
244. Id. at 827-29, 823 P.2d at 1221-22, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620-21.
245. Id. at 830, 823 P.2d at 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
246. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635. The statutory scheme included
California Civil Code section 7017 which required that where a mother of a child without a presumed
father consents to the child's adoption, a petition was required to be filed in the superior court to
terminate the father's parental rights. 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 1363, sec. 9, at 53-55 (amending CAL. Civ.
CODE § 7017). If a man claimed parental rights, the court was required to first determine whether
he was the natural father. Id. If the court found he was the presumed father, then it determined if it
was in the child's best interest for the man to retain his parental rights. Id. If the court found he
should retain his parental rights, then his consent was required for an adoption. Id. Under California
Civil Code section 224, mothers and presumed fathers could withhold their consent to the adoption
except in four narrow circumstances, including when a court declared the child free of the parent's
custody and control, when the parent had voluntarily relinquished his or her rights in a judicial
proceeding, when the parent had deserted the child, and where the parent relinquished the child for
adoption. 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 714, sec. 47, at 2588-89 (amending CAL CIV. CODE § 224) (current
version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.20). Effective January 1, 1994, section 221.20 will appear at
California Family Code sections 8604-8606. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 570-71
(West). Therefore, the statutory scheme created three classifications of parents. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th
1663
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 24
unilaterally preclude the biological father from becoming a
presumed father, thereby permitting the State to terminate a father's
parental rights on a mere showing of the child's best interest.247
The court concluded that section 7004's broad grant of discretion
to trial courts violated the unwed father's constitutional rights.248
The California Supreme Court reasoned that the statute created
a gender-based distinction between unmarried mothers and
unmarried fathers and applied an intermediate standard of review
for substantive due process and equal protection as articulated in
Caban v. Mohammed was applied.2 49  In so doing, the court
questioned whether a statute which allowed the mother the ability
to prevent a putative father from obtaining the same rights given
to mothers and presumed fathers substantially served an important
governmental interest.250 According to the court, providing for the
well-being of children born out of wedlock was an important State
interest." The more difficult question was whether this interest
was substantially furthered by permitting a mother to deny the
biological father an opportunity to form a relationship with his
child that would give the father the same statutory rights as the
mother or a presumed father. 2
at 825, 823 P.2d at 1219, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618. The three classes were mothers, biological fathers
who were presumed fathers, and biological fathers who were not presumed fathers (i.e., putative
fathers). Id. The putative father's consent to his child's adoption was not required unless he had made
a showing that retention of his parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Id. In contrast,
where consent was required of a mother or a presumed father, no inquiry into the child's best interest
was required. Id. Therefore, the natural father was treated differently than both mothers and presumed
fathers. Id.; see supra note 17 (reviewing California Civil Code section 7004).
247. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
248. Id. The California Legislature has yet to amend California Civil Code section 7004 or to
replace the section and scheme found unconstitutional. The only action taken after the Kelsey S.
decision has been to codify footnote 14, excluding the extension of presumed father status to a man
who impregnates a woman as a result of nonconsensual sexual intercourse. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv.
ch. 559, sec. 1, at 1753 (West) (amending CAL. CiV. CODE § 7004(b)).
249. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 844, 823 P.2d at 1233,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632. The court examined
whether the distinction served important governmental objectives and was substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. Id.; see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (holding
that the appropriate standard of review for cases involving gender discrimination is an intermediate
standard); see also supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Caban case).
250. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 844, 823 P.2d at 1233, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 844-45, 823 P.2d at 1233, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.
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In addressing this question, the court first noted that Steven and
Suzanne, the adoptive parents, had not adequately explained how
the State's interest in the well-being of the child was furthered by
allowing the mother to have control over the putative father's
rights. 3 Nonetheless, the court inferred their argument to be that
allowing a biological father to have the same rights to consent as
an unwed mother would make adoption more difficult. 4 The
court found this reasoning flawed, however, because such a
proposition would assume that the proper governmental objective
was adoption, a position the court was not willing to take. 5
There was also no evidence to support the argument that an unwed
mother's decision to permit an immediate adoption of her infant
was always preferable to custody by the natural father.256
Therefore, the court found the distinction between mothers and
putative fathers had no substantial relationship to protecting the
well-being of the child. 7
The majority held that an unwed father who had promptly come
forward and demonstrated his commitment to fulfilling his parental
responsibilities was entitled to protection of such a relationship
under his federal constitutional rights of substantive due process
and equal protection." Termination of his parental relationship
was prohibited unless the father was shown to be an unfit
parent. 9 Absent such a showing, it was presumed the child's
253. Id. at 845, 823 P.2d at 1233, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.
254. Id. The consent of both parents would be more difficult to obtain than just the consent of
the mother. Id. Therefore, according to the court, Steven and Suzanne argued that allowing an unwed
mother to have control over the biological father's rights furthered the State's interest in the well-
being of the child. Id.
255. Id. at 845, 823 P.2d at 1234, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
256. Id. at 846, 823 P.2d at 1234, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
257. Id. at 847, 823 P.2d at 1235, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634.
258. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635. Where the unwed father had fulfilled
his parental responsibilities, his parental rights were entitled to the same degree of protection as were
the rights of the mother. Id. The court noted that its analysis would be the same under either due
process or equal protection review. Id. at 844, 823 P.2d at 1233, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; see supra
notes 36-148 and accompanying text (reviewing the United States Supreme Court cases which
illustrate how a father can demonstrate his full commitment).
259. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
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well-being was best served by the continuation of the father's
parental relationship.2"
The majority's test creates a threshold test question of whether
the father has demonstrated a sufficient commitment to his parental
responsibilities.26 Two factors were identified for trial courts to
consider when making this determination.262 First, the trial must
examine the father's conduct throughout the period since he had
learned he was the biological father.263 Once the father knew or
reasonably should have known of the pregnancy, he must have
promptly attempted to assume his parental responsibilities as fully
as the mother would have allowed and his circumstances would
have permitted.'" The court can also inquire into the father's
conduct during the legal proceedings, both in the trial and appellate
courts.265 In particular, the father has to have demonstrated a
willingness to assume full custody of the child himself.266 It is
not enough for the father merely to want to block the adoption by
others.267 Second, the trial court must consider the father's public
acknowledgement of paternity, payment of pregnancy and birth
260. Id.
261. Id. The threshold question is to be addressed by a court before evaluating whether the
father can be deprived of the right to withhold his consent to the adoption. Id. at 850, 823 P.2d at
1237,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636. Several cases have been heard by the California courts of appeal which
help clarify what is required of the father to demonstrate his commitment. For more information on
these cases, see In re Sarah C., 8 Cal. App. 4th 964, 973, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414,418 (4th Dist. 1992)
(finding that the father had not demonstrated a sufficient commitment to his parental responsibilities
where he never attempted to have the child listed as a beneficiary, only once contribute any money
to the mother and child, and made little attempt to provide his child with a home); Michael M. v.
Giovanna F., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1277, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460, 462-63 (1st Dist. 1992) (finding an
unconstitutional infringement of the father's substantive due process rights where he had filed suit
to declare paternity, had attempted to send money to the mother, and had established a bank account
in the child's name); see also infra notes 324-342 and accompanying text (discussing the California
cases since Kelsey S.).
262. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
263. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236-37, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635-36.
264. Id.
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expenses commensurate with his ability to pay, and prompt legal
action to seek custody of his child.268
If the trial court determines that the father has adequately
demonstrated a commitment to his parental responsibilities, it
should then inquire as to whether the father can be deprived of the
right to withhold his consent to the adoption.269 In making this
determination, the trial court looks at the father's conduct and
circumstances leading up to and including the trial, appellate, and
remand periods.27 The proper standard to be applied is be
whether the father is fit or unfit to be a parent at the time of review
by the court.27' A finding of unfitness would need to be
supported by clear and convincing evidence.272 If this standard
cannot be met, then the father can be permitted to withhold his
consent to the adoption.273
In sum, the majority held that an unwed father can not become
a presumed father by virtue of constructive receipt of his child.274
On the other hand, fathers are protected by due process and equal
protection under the Federal Constitution if they have done all that
they reasonably can to demonstrate commitment to their parental
responsibilities.275  California's statutory scheme was held
unconstitutional because it permitted a mother to unilaterally
preclude the natural father from becoming a presumed father.276
268. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1237,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636. The California Supreme Court noted
that their decision afforded no protection to a man who impregnated a woman as a result of
nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Id. at 849 n.14, 823 P.2d at 1237 n.14, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636 n.14.
The court noted that no high court decisions had found a right to due process in such a circumstance.
Id. Additionally, the father would not be entitled to equal protection with a mother or a father
involved in a consensual sexual relationship since he would not be similarly situated. Id.
269. Id. at 850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 851, 823 P.2d at 1238,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637.
272. Id. at 851, 823 P.2d at 1238, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 829, 823 P.2d at 1222-23, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621-22.
275. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
276. Id.
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C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Mosk
Justice Mosk wrote separately and briefly, concurring only in
the majority's result.277 He stated that his concern for children
prevented him from joining in the reasoning of the majority.278
Justice Mosk believed that the court's decision to find Civil Code
section 7004 unconstitutional would create needless uncertainty in
the application of the statutory categories of presumed and natural
fathers. 9 This uncertainty would disadvantage all parties, but
especially the child.2"'
Justice Mosk felt that the majority should have looked for a
more simple legal solution before reaching a constitutional
question.281 He felt an easier solution existed if the facts could
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Rickie was the
biological father and had been frustrated in his attempts to achieve
presumed father status by the devious acts of the mother.212 The
doctrine of equitable estoppel could be used by the court to prevent
the mother and prospective adoptive parents from denying that
Rickie had assumed the status of a presumed father. 283 Thus, the
court could permit Rickie to have a fitness hearing without creating
a precedent that might produce unfortunate results in many other
proceedings, including those already concluded.284 Justice Mosk
277. Id. at 852, 823 P.2d at 1239,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. Justice Mosk was not specific about the disadvantages he anticipated. Id. It is
conceivable, however, that Justice Mosk was anticipating delays in the adoption process would be
caused by an unwed father's ability to claim he was a presumed father, even when he had not
actually established a relationship with his child. See infra notes 344-355 and accompanying text
(discussing the effect of the Kelsey S. decision on children and adoptive parents).
281. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 852, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting.) Justice Mosk referred to the California case of People v. Williams, 16
Cal. 3d 663, 667, 547 P.2d 1000, 1003, 128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (1976), as settling the law that the
court should not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required. Id. at 852, 823 P.2d at
1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
282. Id. at 853,823 P.2d at 1239,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 853-54, 823 P.2d at 1239-40, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638-39 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Mosk offered no examples of the "unfortunate results" which might result from
the majority's decision. Id.
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wrote that he would have remanded the case to the trial court for
factual proceedings consistent with his opinion.2 5
II. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The Kelsey S. decision addresses a question which had
previously been left open by the United States Supreme Court
regarding the federal constitutional rights of unwed fathers." 6
The California Supreme Court rested its decision entirely on federal
constitutional law and it therefore remains to be seen whether the
United States Supreme Court will approve of the California court's
analysis of the federal constitutional rights of unwed fathers." 7
At the same time, the California Supreme Court's holding fails to
resolve other issues, not the least of which are whether a biological
father can actually meet the constitutional threshold test developed
by Kelsey S.,288 and what the effect of the Kelsey S. threshold test
will be on the adoption process.289 Additionally, inaction on the
part of the California Legislature has left the California statutes in
conflict with the Kelsey S. holding.29
A. Will the United States Supreme Court Agree with
California's Interpretation?
Kelsey S. dealt with a situation where the mother did not wish
to raise the child as her own.29 ' Instead, she sought to unilaterally
prevent the biological father from becoming a presumed father,
thereby denying him any opportunity to contest the adoption. 92
285. Id. at 854, 823 P.2d at 1240,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
286. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236-37,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635-36; see supra notes 236-276 and
accompanying text (discussing the holding of the Kelsey S. court).
287. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 839, 823 P.2d at 1229, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628.
288. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635; see supra notes 261-268 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority's threshold test).
289. See infra notes 344-355 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of Kelsey S. on
children, adoptive parents, and unwed fathers).
290. See supra note 248 (discussing the legislative response to Kelsey S.).
291. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
292. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616; see supra notes 220-235 and
accompanying text (discussing the Kelsey S. case).
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The California Supreme Court recognized that this issue had never
been decided by the United States Supreme Court.293 In reaching
its decision, the California majority relied solely on federal
constitutional principles.294 If the United States Supreme Court
were to review a case based on similar facts, it is uncertain whether
the United States high court would agree with the California
court's analysis.
The constitutional rights of unwed fathers have been developing
for the past twenty years.295 The United States Supreme Court's
most recent decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.296 appears to
limit the rights of unwed fathers somewhat, at least where the
mother is married at the time of the child's birth.297 One court
has noted, however, that Michael H. left open the question whether
the result would have been the same if the marital parents had
wanted to place the child for adoption.29' Four justices in the
Michael H. case continued to believe that unwed fathers have a
protected liberty interest in their relationships with their
children.299 Moreover, the Michael H. decision rested heavily on
the State's purported interest in preserving the family unit."°
Where an unwed mother is placing the child for adoption vith
strangers, the biological father's right to establish a relationship
with his child may weigh more heavily since protection of a
unitary family would not be at issue. Additionally, there is the
293. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 830, 823 P.2d at 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
294. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
295. See supra notes 36-148 and accompanying text (reviewing the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court).
296. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
297. See Kisthardt, supra note 7, at 624 (arguing the plurality's decision can only be seen as
a departure from the precedent set before Michael H.); see also supra notes 123-148 and
accompanying text (discussing the Michael H. case).
298. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 837, 823 P.2d at 1228, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627 (noting a decision
of the New York Court of Appeals which observed that Justice Scalia left open the question of
whether the result would have been different if the marital parents had not wanted to raise the child
as their own); see In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 401, 559 N.B.2d 418, 423 (N.Y. 1990)
(discussing the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Michael H., and noting how the Justices
voted).
299. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142-43 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at
159-60 (White, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 123.
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already recognized interest of an unwed father to form a
relationship with his child which at least four, and perhaps five,
members of the Supreme Court supported in Michael H.30 1 Of
course, since the Michael H. decision the Court membership has
changed slightly.3 2 Still, if the United States Supreme Court
follows twenty years of precedent involving unwed fathers and
their adoption rights, the Court might conclude that Kelsey S. was
properly decided.0 3
B. Can a Natural Father Cross the Constitutional Threshold?
The Kelsey S. Court established a threshold federal
constitutional question to be considered by the lower courts in
determining whether a natural father has demonstrated a sufficient
commitment to his parental responsibilities. 3' The first factor to
be considered is the putative father's conduct throughout the period
since he had learned he was the biological father. 3 5 This period
includes the legal proceedings at both the trial and appellate
levels.0 6 Second, the trial court is to look at the father's public
acknowledgment of paternity, financial support toward the birth
expenses commensurate with his ability to pay, and prompt legal
action to seek custody of his child.3 7 The potential difficulty for
the father to demonstrate his parental commitment seems apparent,
given the types of activities he must undertake and the potentially
301. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting and
joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun); Id. at 159-60 (White, J., dissenting); see supra notes 36-
148 and accompanying text (reviewing the establishment of the United States Supreme Court's rule
in unwed father cases).
302. See NOWAK, supra note 40, app. at 1261 (charting the composition of the United States
Supreme Court). In 1990, Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan and in 1992 Justice Thomas
replaced Justice Marshall. Id.
303. See supra notes 36-148 and accompanying text (reviewing the precedent set by the United
Supreme Court in cases involving the constitutional rights of unwed fathers).
304. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816,849,823 P.2d 1216, 1236,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615,635.
If a court finds that he has demonstrated a full commitment, then a further question of the father's
fitness as a parent is raised. Id. at 850,823 P.2d at 1237,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636; see supra notes 261-
268 and accompanying text (reviewing the threshold question adopted by the court).
305. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
306. Id. at 850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
307. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
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long period of time which might pass from the beginning of legal
action through any appeals and remands.
The Kelsey S. court recognized that a putative father might be
restricted, both legally and as a practical matter, in his ability to
demonstrate his full commitment to his child.308 Nonetheless, it
admonished the trial court to consider whether the father had done
all he reasonably could have under the circumstances." 9 Thus, a
trial judge must make a factual determination in each case as to
whether the father has made a sufficient commitment to his
parental responsibilities."0
In the case of Kelsey S., it is questionable whether Rickie
actually met the threshold test.3 1' Rickie had instituted legal
proceedings to be recognized as the father, attempted to receive at
least temporary custody of his child, and objected to the child's
adoption by a third party as soon as he learned Kari was
pregnant.312 Although, the California Supreme Court recognized
that the evidence of Rickie's support was in dispute, particularly
for the period prior to Kelsey's birth, the court also stated that the
Quilloin v. Walcott decision strongly suggested that Rictde's
parental rights could not be terminated without a showing of his
unfitness as a father. 313 Quoting from Lehr v. Robertson, the
court emphasized that the unwed father need only make a
reasonable and meaningful attempt to establish a relationship with
his child.3 14 Therefore, it was not necessary for Rickie to be
308. Id. at 850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636; see supra notes 222-235 and
accompanying text (discussing the steps Rickie took to establish his commitment and some of the
difficulties he faced).
309. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
310. See id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
311. See id. at 822-23, 823 P.2d at 1217-18, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616-17 (reviewing the steps
taken by Rickie to develop a relationship with Kelsey).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 833, 850, 823 P.2d at 1225, 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624, 636; see Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (affirming that the relationship between parent and child is
protected under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution).
314. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 837, 823 P.2d at 1228, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627; see Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (identifying the need for the biological father to grasp his
opportunity to accept some level of responsibility for his child's future); see also supra notes 95-121
and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Lehr).
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successful in his attempts to take Kelsey into his home." 5
Nonetheless, in light of decisions by other California courts, the
lower court could have found that Rickie had not done all that he
could to demonstrate his parental commitment to Kelsey.316 If
this assumption is accurate, then the actions taken by Rickie were
not reasonable and an unwed father who wishes to block his child's
adoption must do more than that which was done by Rickie. The
question is, what more must the father do? Various later decisions
of California courts of appeal may shed some light on what the
courts will look for in determining if the father has fulfilled his
parental commitment.
In Jermstad v. McNelis,31 7 the Court of Appeal for the Third
District of California found that Jermstad, the father, had diligently
pursued his opportunity to establish a custodial relationship with
his child.31 Jermstad expressed an early interest in custody of his
child, first raising the subject with the mother while she was still
pregnant.319 At the same time, he displayed maturity by
recognizing that as a sailor who spent considerable periods of time
at sea, he might have had difficulty obtaining custody.3 20
Jermstad filed suit to establish his parental relationship with his
child twelve days after the child was born. 321 Based on these
facts, the court of appeal affirmed the lower court decision granting
custody to Jermstad. 3' For the Jermstad court, the father's
actions there were sufficient to prove his commitment as a
parent.
323
315. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 837, 823 P.2d at 1228,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627; see Lehr, 463 U.S.
at 262 (identifying the need for the biological father to grasp his opportunity to accept some level
of responsibility for his child's future); see also supra notes 95-121 and accompanying text
(discussing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Lehr).
316. See supra notes 153-216, 261 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant decisions
of several California courts).
317. 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (3d DisL 1989).
318. See id. at 533,258 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21; see also supra notes 206-216 and accompanying
text (reviewing the Jermstad case).
319. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 533, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 534, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
322. Id. at 532, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
323. Id.
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In Michael M. v. Giovanna F., a decision that followed Kelsey
S., the First District Court of Appeal also found that a biological
father had taken every step open to him to form a relationship with
this child. 24 In Michael M., the father attempted to find out from
the mother how her pregnancy was proceeding, but she did not
respond, and in fact obtained a restraining order to keep the father
away.31 Subsequently, the father attempted to see his son, but
was refused permission." A second restraining order was then
obtained by the mother.327 The father filed for a declaration of
paternity and joint legal custody of his son. 28 Additionally, the
father sent a check to the mother for the child's support.3 29 The
check was returned to him, and he used it to establish a bank
account for the child's benefit.3 1 On the basis of these facts, the
Michael M. court held that the father had established his
constitutional right to have his parental interest preserved.33'
In In re Sarah C.,33 2 the Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District of California found that a father had not fulfilled his
commitment to his parental responsibility.333 The unwed father,
Paul, acknowledged to a few friends that Sarah was his daughter,
but he never sought to have himself listed as the father on the birth
certificate.33 Paul never sought to tell Mr. C., who assumed
himself to be the father, that Sarah was Paul's daughter.335
Additionally, Paul failed to complete paperwork with the Navy to
have Sarah named as a dependent and beneficiary of any
insurance.336 Paul did not provide a home for his daughter and he
324. Michael M. v. Giovanna F., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1280-81, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460,465 (lst
Dist. 1992); see supra note 261 (discussing the Michael M. case and its relation to Kelsey S.),
325. Michael M., 5 Cal. App. 4th at 1277, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1277, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 1280-81, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465.
332. In re Sarah C., 8 Cal. App. 4th 964, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414 (4th Dist. 1992).
333. Id. at 972-73, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418.
334. Id. at 973, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418.
335. Id. at 973, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418.
336. Id.
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only once contributed money to provide for his child's rent, food
and other expenses.337 Paul only lived with Sarah and her mother
for a brief period before he was arrested for being absent without
leave.338 Thereafter, he made no attempt to provide his daughter
with a home.339 Additionally, Paul did not attempt to see Sarah
or establish a relationship with her, nor did he send her any gifts,
letters or photographs of himself.3 ° Paul did not attend parenting
classes, obtain therapy, or have a psychological evaluation or drug
test.3 ' Under these circumstances, the court of appeal found that
substantial evidence supported the finding that Paul had not shown
a commitment to his parental responsibility.342 In re Sarah C.
joins Kelsey S. as an example of the father not doing enough to
prove his commitment to his parental responsibilities.
The above cases illustrate that a great deal of discretion is left
in the hands of the lower courts to decide if the father has met the
constitutional threshold. Each case is unique and the final decision
rests on whether the trial court believes that the father has acted
reasonably in his attempt to show his commitment to his parental
responsibilities.343 Leaving so much discretion in the hands of the
judge makes it difficult for the unwed father to predict whether he
will be successful in his attempt to prove his commitment to his
parental responsibility. Nevertheless, given the important interest
of protecting young children, it seems appropriate that each
decision be focused on the specific facts relating to the unwed
father's actions.
If a putative father's actions are to be held to such a strict




340. Id. at 977, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421. In fact, Paul requested and received a photograph of
Sarah from the Department of Social Services. Id. at 977 n.3, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421 n.3. The
Department then suggested that Paul send a picture of himself to his daughter, but he failed to do so
and later said he had no reason for not having sent one. Id.
341. Id. at 977, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421.
342. Id.
343. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816,849-50,823 P.2d 1216, 1237,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615,
636 (1992).
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counsel to make every conceivable, but legal, effort to demonstrate
his total commitment to his parental duties. To show that he is
interested in an emotional commitment with his child, the natural
father should file suit to establish his parental relationship with his
child immediately after the child's birth. Throughout the pregnancy,
the father should express his interest in establishing parental
custody. The unwed father should also publicly acknowledge that
he is the natural father of the child, both during pregnancy and
after birth. Making arrangements for daycare and enrolling in
parenting classes would also demonstrate the father's commitment
to having custody of his child. If the child has been born and the
father is not legally restrained from seeing the child, he should visit
the child at the hospital immediately after her birth. To demonstrate
his financial commitment to his child, the unwed father should
make arrangements to pay all or part of the mother's pregnancy
expenses, based on his financial resources. Additionally, the father
should continue to offer payments to the mother for his child's
benefit after the birth. In the event that the mother will not accept
money from the father, either during pregnancy or after the child's
birth, then it is advised that the father establish a bank account or
make a similar financial arrangement for his child's benefit. Taking
steps to ensure his employment stability will also demonstrate the
unwed father's financial commitment. If the unwed father follows
at least the above-mentioned suggestions, it would seem that he
would stand a good chance of meeting the Kelsey S. threshold test,
thereby demonstrating his parental commitment. Nevertheless, it is
once again emphasized that each case will be factually unique and
it is not altogether certain how a judge will rule.
C. What Impact Will the Kelsey S. Decision Have on Children
and Adoptive Parents?
Prior to the Kelsey S. decision, an adoption by third parties
could have proceeded without the consent of a biological father
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who was not the presumed father.3 Therefore, consent was
generally required only of the mother, who was most likely the
parent placing the child for adoption in the first place.345 After
Kelsey S., if a putative father promptly comes forward and
convinces the court of his full commitment to his parental
responsibilities, then he is entitled to a hearing on his fitness.346
The additional step of a fitness hearing would not have been
required under the statutory scheme prior to Kelsey S.34 If the
judge makes this factual decision in a prompt manner, it is possible
that the adoption process will not be significantly delayed.
If the time required for the adoption proceedings to be
completed is extended, the losers would seem to be the child and
the prospective adoptive parents. A delay in the process would
mean that the child's future home would be uncertain, at least
temporarily. Assuming that the child is living with the adoptive
parents during the court proceedings, she may have begun
developing a relationship with the adoptive family.348 If the child
is then moved to the home of his father, the postplacement change
might be harmful to the child, the very person the adoption system
is designed to assist.
349
344. See supra notes 36-148 and accompanying text (reviewing the United States Supreme
Court holdings preceding Kelsey S.).
345. CLARY, supra note 3, § 21.2, at 572. See generally Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment,
The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 917, 970-71
(1991) (reviewing the statutory scheme before Kelsey S.).
346. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
347. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (outlining California Civil Code section 7004).
348. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTs op THE CHILD 22 (1973)
(noting that adoption allows the opportunity for the child and adoptive parents to form a
psychological relationship).
349. See id. at 32-33 (recognizing that disrupting the child's environment can be detrimental
to the child's development). Experts believe that removing a child from the only parents she has
ever known substantially after placement with them is traumatic for the child. Id. at 31-34. Smooth
growth is affected when there are upheavals in the child's external world. Id. at 32. Multiple
placement has such a strong influence on the child's development that she may be beyond the reach
of educational influence and behave in a way that courts consider dissocial, delinquent, or criminal.
Id. at 34; see also Dickson, supra note 345, at 978 (discussing the harm to adoptive children caused
by postplacement changes).
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The harm to the prospective adoptive parents by prolonging the
proceeding is obvious from the perspective of legal costs
alone. 5 Additionally, the adoptive parents suffer emotionally if
the child is separated from them after a prolonged period. 351 First,
the adopters will have loved and cared for the infant from the time
she entered their home, thereby becoming emotionally attached to
the child.352 Second, the adoptive parents will have suffered
financially from legal fees and support and medical expenses to the
birthmother.353 On the other hand, if slowing down the procedure
allows a father to realize his constitutionally protected right to form
a relationship with his child, then the delay may be justifiable, at
least from the point of view of the unwed father.
A solution seems apparent. By expediting adoption proceedings,
particularly where the biological father is asserting his parental
rights, the harm to all parties will be reduced. It is feasible for a
court to expeditiously hold a hearing to determine if a putative
father has met the Kelsey S. threshold test. The proof required in
a Kelsey S. hearing would not be significantly more difficult for a
court to manage than that in an action to sever paternity where a
hearing is required within forty-five days from the filing of the
petition. 54 A hearing to determine if an unwed father has
fulfilled his responsibilities to this parental commitment could be
350. See Dickson, supra note 345, at 968 (noting that adoptive parents suffer financially, partly
from legal fees).
351. See id. at 978 (discussing the negative effects of uncertain custody on adoptive parents).
352. See iL (discussing the negative effects of uncertain custody on adoptive parents). The
author also suggests that one parent will probably have quit work to care for the child since only 25%
of surveyed companies offer adoption leave. Id. at 968 n.264.
353. See id. at 978 (referring to the negative effects of uncertain custody on adoptive parents);
see also id. at 968 (quoting NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOI, UNrED
STATES DATA, IssuEs, REGULATIONS AND REsOuRcEs 3 (1989)). The author cites statistics showing
that independent adoption costs run from $2,000 to $20,000. Id. at n.264.
354. Under the current statutory scheme, an action to terminate parental rights must be set for
hearing not more than 45 days after filing of the petition and completion of service. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 7017.2(a) (West Supp. 1993). Effective January 1, 1994, the statute will appear at California Family
Code section 7667-68. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 554 (West). The matter then has
precedence over other civil matters on the date set for trial, except proceedings to have a minor child
declared free from the custody and control of either or both parents. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017.2(b)
(West Supp. 1993). A continuance may be granted by the court for good cause, but only for the
period demonstrated to the court as necessary based on the evidence. Id.
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held within a similar forty-five day time period. Also, since actions
to determine the existence of the father and child relationship may
normally be consolidated with a hearing to terminate the parental
relationship, the Kelsey S. hearing could also be consolidated.355
Although local conditions might dictate how quickly a Kelsey S.
hearing could be placed on the court's calendar, it is feasible for
superior courts to adopt local court rules to address the need for
speedy treatment of such adoption considerations. Regardless of
delay, if the father's constitutional rights are to be protected, it
would seem that he should be allowed to fight for retention of his
parental rights where he has made a full commitment to his
parental responsibilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court, in Kelsey S., extended the
federal constitutional rights of putative fathers in California.
Whether a similar extension of federal equal protection and due
process guarantees would be made by the United States Supreme
Court is somewhat unpredictable, given recent changes in the
Court's membership. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court
should maintain its precedent that unwed fathers are afforded
guarantees of equal protection and due process under the Federal
Constitution so long as they have established a parental relationship
with their children. Where an unwed father has done all that he
reasonably could to establish such a relationship with his child but
has been thwarted by the mother or prospective adoptive parents,
the United States Supreme Court should afford him constitutional
protection.
Since the decision as to whether the unwed father has done all
that he reasonably could to establish a parental commitment with
his child is a factual one to be made by the court, the father should
take steps to clearly demonstrate his emotional and financial
355. CAL. Cv. CoDE § 7006 (West Supp. 1993). Effective January 1, 1994, the statute will
appear at California Family Code section 7630-34. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, see. 10, at 550-51
(West).
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commitment to his child. Above all else, the father must
demonstrate that he wants to take his child into his own home and
raise her. It is not enough for the father merely to want to block an
adoption. Where a court sees that a father wants to personally raise
his child, has publicly acknowledged the child as his own, and has
made living and daycare arrangements for the child after its birth,
the court should find that the father has met the burden of proving
his emotional commitment. Also, where the father has attempted to
pay for pregnancy expenses and has planned for the child's
financial support, the court should find that the unwed father has
met the burden of proving his financial commitment. Unless other
factors exist which strongly suggest that the father is not committed
to a parental relationship, then the court should find that the father
is the presumed father and should afford him appropriate
constitutional and statutory protection.
Finally, any potential adverse effects on the child and the
adoptive parents as a result of Kelsey S. prolonging the adoption
process can be minimized if courts expedite adoption proceedings.
Holding a Kelsey S. hearing within forty-five days of a petition to
sever paternity is feasible and would not significantly prolong the
adoption process. The Kelsey S. hearing could be easily
consolidated with a hearing to terminate the parental relationship.
A policy of expediting these proceedings should be written into the
local rules of California's superior courts.
Kelsey S. has made it more likely that an unwed father will be
permitted to establish a parental relationship with his child even
where the mother wishes to place the child for adoption.
Appropriately, the burden rests on the unwed father to demonstrate
that he is fully committed to a parental relationship. It is
significant, however, that the father at least has the right to attempt
to preserve the potential father-child relationship. It is consistent
with the State's interest of ensuring the health and safety of
children to allow the unwed father to have custody where it is clear
to a court that he is committed to his child and that it would be in
the best interest of the child to place her with her father.
Norman E. Allen
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